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On a Quest for Reason: A New Look at
Surreptitious Search Warrants
by
PAUL V. KONOVALOV*

Introduction
In December 1984, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents were conducting an investigation of a rural Northern California
residence suspected to be the site of an illegal methamphetamine laboratory.' Pursuant to their investigation, the investigating agents applied for a search warrant allowing the agents to enter and search the
residence.2 The search warrant that the supervising magistrate issued
to the agents, however, was strikingly unusual. Unlike a conventional
search warrant, the "surreptitious entry" warrant issued by the magistrate permitted the agents "to enter the home while no one else was
there, look around, and leave without removing anything."'3 Armed
*

J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 1997; B.S. Georgetown University,
1993. I wish to thank Professors Evan Lee and Rory Little for their valuable suggestions
and assistance in shaping earlier versions of this Note. I also thank my parents, Olga and
Vladimir Konovalov, for their love and support. This Note is dedicated to the memory of
my brother Gregory, whose generosity and kindness will always serve as an inspiration to
me.
1. United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560, 1563-64 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and
remanded, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
Methamphetamine, commonly referred to as "crank" or "speed," is a powerful stimulant. Its pharmacological properties are similar to those of amphetamine, although it can
be distinguished structurally from amphetamine because it has a methyl group on the terminal amine. As a result, methamphetamine produces both greater and longer central
nervous system stimulation than amphetamine. While not chemically related to cocaine,
methamphetamine users allege that the onset of action and euphoria following intravenous
methamphetamine use is similar to the inhalation of crack cocaine.
Methamphetamine can be produced from simple processes that do not require special
knowledge or expertise in chemistry. The relatively easy methods of manufacture have
undoubtedly accounted for some of its widespread popularity. See Robert L. Norton et al.,
Blood Lead of Intravenous Drug Users, 34 J. TOXICOLOGY:

CLINICAL

TOXICOLOGY 425,

425 (1996).
2. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1453.
3. Id. The supervising magistrate who issued the warrant used a standard warrant
form, but crossed out the requirements that property be seized and that a copy of the
warrant and an inventory of the property taken be left at the residence. See infra text
accompanying notes 63-64.
[435]
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with the warrant, the agents entered the residence, confirmed the
presence of a methamphetamine laboratory, and left without seizing
or disturbing any property. 4 Several days later, the agents returned to
arrest the owners of the residence and seize evidence of the
methamphetamine laboratory. 5
During their trial, United States v. Freitas,6 the defendants successfully argued that the surreptitious search violated their Fourth
Amendment rights and that, therefore, the evidence should be suppressed. 7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed that the evidence should be suppressed. 8 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the failure to provide reasonable post-search notice to
the owner of the premises searched violated the defendants' constitutionally-protected privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment. 9 In
the years since Freitas, the Ninth Circuit has consistently explained
that post-search notice within a reasonable time is a constitutional requirement under the Fourth Amendment. 10
The only other Circuit Court of Appeal to consider the legality of
surreptitious search warrants has not adopted the reasoning and standard proposed by the Ninth Circuit in Freitas. In its most recent treatment of surreptitious search warrants,1" for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that reasonable post-search notice was necessary, but then explained that the requirement of postsearch notice is not compelled by the Constitution. 12 Instead, the Second Circuit has observed that the requirement for post-search notice
can only be
found in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 13
4. Freitas,610 F. Supp. at 1564.
5. Freitas,800 F.2d at 1453. The agents had obtained a second conventional search
warrant based upon their observations of "extensive laboratory equipment and chemicals
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine" during the surreptitious search. Id.
6. Freitas,610 F. Supp. at 1560.
7. Id. at 1571-73. The district court suppressed the evidence from the second search
because it resulted from, and was therefore tainted by, the prior unconstitutional surreptitious search. Id. at 1569-71.
8. Freitas,800 F.2d at 1456.
9. Id.
10. For examples of this line of reasoning, see United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993), and United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131
(9th Cir. 1988), appeal after remand, 948 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S.
1226 (1992), both of which are discussed infra Part II.
11. United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
12. Id. at 449-50.

13. Id. at 454-55. In particular, the Second Circuit rejected what it referred to as the
Ninth Circuit's "somewhat amorphous" Fourth Amendment privacy interests analysis. Id.
For a discussion of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see infra Part
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While only the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit have directly
ruled on the constitutionality of surreptitious search warrants, albeit
with slightly different results, there is reason to believe that more frequent use of surreptitious search warrants by law enforcement agents
will force other courts to wrestle with the issue of surreptitious search
warrants in the near future. Although federal law enforcement agencies have contended that they should be used only under "extraordinary" circumstances, 14 surreptitious search warrants may well be
viewed by federal and state law enforcement agents as effective tools
in criminal investigations. 15 Some scholars have recently suggested,
for example, that surreptitious search warrants should be used in criminal investigations ranging from computer crime' 6 to domestic terrorism. 17 In addition, as the federal government intensifies its campaign
to combat drug use generally, and methamphetamine use in particular, increased use of surreptitious search warrants is likely.' 8
14. See John Kent Walker, Jr., Note, Covert Searches, 39 STAN. L. REv. 545, 546-47
nn.5 & 8 (1987) (quoting Federal Bureau of Investigation guidelines for covert searches,
which explain that covert entries should only be requested where a "compelling government need" exists). The author notes that federal law enforcement agencies had, by the
end of 1984, already conducted "at least 35 covert searches." Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
15. The federal government's recent use of a surreptitious search warrant in its investigation of an Ohio company suspected of violating federal environmental regulations illustrates just how wide the scope of potential uses of these warrants might be. In the
unreported Ohio case, federal agents obtained a surreptitious search warrant allowing
them to secretly enter a Hamilton, Ohio metal plating firm and install a hidden camera.
The agents installed the hidden camera to monitor the plant's waste disposal practices after
being tipped off by employees of the plant that the plant was violating federal wastewater
regulations. Based upon the images captured by the hidden camera, a federal grand jury
indicted five officials of the plant. See Ben L. Kaufman, Five Indicted in Waste Disposa.

Films Show Company Dumped Untreated Water, CINCINNATI

ENOUIRER,

Jan. 27, 1996, at

B3.
16. See John T. Soma et al., Computer Crime: Substantive Statutes & Technical &
Legal Search Considerations,39 A.F. L. REv. 225, 235 (1996) (describing how Air Force
Judge Advocates and Office of Special Investigations Special Agents investigating computer crimes may obtain "surreptitious entry" warrants to "enter the computer system"
and copy the files of a suspect without alerting the subject of the investigation).
17. See Richard G. Lillie & Paul R. Hernandez, Surreptitious Search Warrants, THE
CHAMPION, June 1996, at 20 (suggesting that Oklahoma City bombing and anticipation of
future terrorism might serve as impetus for increased use of surreptitious search warrants
by law enforcement agencies).
18. In April 1996, President Clinton outlined a new federal drug policy. Among the
main components of the policy were increased financing for law enforcement, border control, treatment of addicts, and a coordinated campaign to combat the spread of
methamphetamine. See Todd S. Purdum, Politics: The Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, April 30,
1996, at B8. As part of his drug strategy, the President explained that he would ask Congress for an additional $1.3 billion (above the then-current budget of $13.8 billion) for drug
control efforts in fiscal year 1997, including $10 million earmarked solely for law enforcement efforts against methamphetamine use. Id. The President also called for increased
penalties for trafficking in the chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and
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Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that the use of
surreptitious search warrants raises critical issues of constitutional import. 19 At the core of the debate between the Ninth and Second Circuits about the constitutional underpinnings of post-search notice is a
serious disagreement about the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 20 The very existence of this constitutional debate, coupled with
the likely increase in the use of surreptitious search warrants, suggests
that the question of what standards should be used in executing surreptitious search warrants deserves greater consideration.
In an attempt to address the disagreement about the appropriate
constitutional limits and requirements regarding surreptitious search
warrants, this Note will argue that post-search notice is not a constitutional requirement under the Fourth Amendment. At the same time,
this Note will suggest that the application of Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to the surreptitious search context also
increased mandatory minimum sentences for methamphetamine possession similar to
those for possession of crack cocaine. Id.
The focus by the federal government on methamphetamine use can perhaps be traced
to the fact that methamphetamine use is rising. Sharp increases in the national use of
methamphetamine have led some experts to conclude that methamphetamine may become
the most frequently abused intravenous drug. See Norton, supra note 1, at 425 (citing
report prepared by National Institute on Drug Abuse) (footnote omitted). The increase in
use is especially high in Southern California, where large rural areas serve as prime sites
for clandestine laboratories for the manufacture of methamphetamine. See Thomas H.
Maugh II, FiguresShow Major Surge in 'Speed' Use, L.A. TiMEs, July 2, 1996, at B1 (citing
report issued by Public Statistics Institute describing significant increases in emergency
room admissions for methamphetamine-related conditions); see also Michelle Nicolosi,
Meth Abuse is Epidemic in Region, ORANGE CoUiNTY REG., July 2, 1996, at BI (citing
increases in both emergency room admissions and number of methamphetamine lab closures in Southern California during 1996). Northern California has also witnessed a dramatic rise in methamphetamine use. See Sabin Russel, 'Speed' HospitalizationsSoar, S.F.
CHRON., July 2, 1996, at A13 (noting similarly increasing numbers of emergency room admissions for methamphetamine use in region).
It should be noted that four of the five primary cases that this Note examines in its
discussion of surreptitious search warrants involve the illegal manufacture of
methamphetamine. See infra Part II.
Increased use of surreptitious search warrants would also be consistent with the federal government's growing tendency to resort to more sophisticated and technologicallyadvanced investigatory tactics. See Jim McGee, Wiretapping Rises Sharply Under Clinton,
WASH. POST, July 7, 1996, at Al (noting thirty to forty percent increase in use of federal
telephone wiretaps under Clinton Administration from 1993 to 1996).
19. In his landmark treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Professor Amsterdam
observed:
I can think of few constitutional issues more important than defining the reach of
the fourth amendment-the extent to which it controls the array of activities of
I can think of few issues more important to a society than the
the police ....
amount of power that it permits its police to use without effective control by law.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
377 (1974).
20. See infra Parts II and III.A.(3).
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does not provide a satisfying answer to the question of when postsearch notice is required. Instead, this Note will propose that the individual privacy concerns considered by the Ninth and Second Circuits
can be more easily protected through judicial adoption of a flexible
reasonableness appproach that balances legitimate government interests and the necessity for a surreptitious search against individual privacy interests.
Part I of this Note describes the general features of surreptitious
searches and provides a brief overview of the constitutional framework of the Fourth Amendment setting forth the requirements for
searches. Part II provides an analysis of the Ninth and Second Circuits' approaches to surreptitious search warrants with a particular focus on the issue of what form of post-search notice is constitutionally
required. Part III traces the development of the concept of notice as
an element of a search from the common law to more recent Supreme
Court decisions, with a particular focus on determining whether a
particular post-search notice requirement is compelled by either the
Fourth Amendment or Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Finally, Part IV proposes a new model for evaluating surreptitious search warrants that is consistent with the Supreme Court's
reasonableness approach to Fourth Amendment searches. While recommending that notice be considered as a factor in evaluating
whether a particular surrpetitious search is reasonable, this Note concludes in Part IV that there should not be an absolute requirement of
post-search notice in the surreptitious search warrant context.
I.

The Fourth Amendment, Conventional Search Warrants,
and Surreptitious Search Warrants

A. The Fourth Amendment and its Historical Roots

The Fourth Amendment, which the Framers added to the Constitution through the Bill of Rights in 1791, provides few explicit requirements for searches. 21 The Amendment contains two clauses: the
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause and the Warrants
Clause.22 From the Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause
("[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
21. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
22. Id.
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be violated") 23 emerges the threshold requirement that searches must
be reasonable. Thus, a literal reading of the text of the amendment
suggests that reasonableness should be the standard for determining
whether a given search comports with the constitutional requirements
of the Fourth Amendment. 24 Courts have hesitated, however, to define exactly what is meant by "reasonableness." 25
The Warrants Clause, meanwhile, requires that warrants only be
issued "upon probable cause, [and be] supported by oath or affirmation."'26 Further, all warrants must describe with particularity the
"place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 27
The Framers undoubtedly created the Fourth Amendment as a
general response (and the Warrants Clause as a more specific response) to the extensive use of "writs of assistance" during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 28 During the 1600s, British
23. Id.
24. For an example of this line of reasoning, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Creationand
Reconstruction of the Bill of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 337, 344-45 (1992) ("The rule that's
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is that the search has to be reasonable."). See also
Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 801 (1994)
("The core of the Fourth Amendment... is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but
reasonableness.") [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment].
Not all constitutional scholars view the Fourth Amendment as driven by this reasonableness approach. See Sundby, infra note 241.
The discussion of the Fourth Amendment here serves merely as a background against
which the cases analyzed in Part II can be understood. For a more in-depth discussion of
the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court's interpretation of its substance, especially
as it relates to surreptitious searches, see infra Part III.
25. As early as 1931, the Supreme Court observed that "[tlhere is no formula for the
determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931), quoted in
NELSON B. LAssON, THi HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 120 n.42 (1937).
26. U.S. CONT. amend. IV. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause under the
Fourth Amendment, two factors must be satisfied: first, the facts charged in the affidavit
must be sufficient to constitute a violation of law; second, the facts presented in the affidavit must justify a reasonable belief that the offense was actually committed, that the accused committed the offense, and that the property is in the place sought to be searched.
LAsSON, supra note 25, at 129.
The Supreme Court has recently reiterated these requirements, explaining that the
showing of probable cause must be viewed by the issuing magistrate under the "totality of
circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). Under the "flexible" standard of Gates, the issuing magistrate is to make a "practical, common-sense decision"
whether there is sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (explaining that the particularity requirement of the Warrants Clause limits police officer discretion in executing the
warrant).
28. See LASSON, supra note 25, at 120. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583
(1980) ("It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the
authority of 'general warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and
adoption of the Fourth Amendment.").
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authorities began to use "writs of assistance," or general search warrants.29 These general warrants were extraordinary because they
failed to specify a definite legal offense committed by the person
against whom they were executed.3 0 In seventeenth century England,
British authorities used general warrants arbitrarily in prosecuting
censoring the press, and enforcing trade regulanon-conformists,
tions. 31 Consequently, when the British enacted trade regulations for
the American colonies during the first half of the eighteenth century
in order to protect British industry and commerce, British authorities
began using general warrants in the colonies as well.32 Once the colonies became independent, the Framers designed the Fourth Amendment (and, especially, the Warrants Clause) as an impediment to
future uses of general warrants. 33 They believed that, in prescribing
the requirement of probable cause and in requiring a description of
the particular place to be searched, persons to be apprehended, and
objects to be seized, they were sufficiently limiting the scope of
searches? 4
B. The Issuance and Execution of Conventional Search Warrants

In general, the issuance and execution of conventional search
warrants is governed by the procedural requirements of Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.35 To obtain a conventional
search warrant, a federal law enforcement agent or government attorney must first make an ex parte application to a federal judge or mag29. See

LASSON,

supra note 25, at 28.

30. Id. at 29.
31. Id. at 28. British authorities used general warrants until they were ruled invalid in
the eighteenth-century case of Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). In
Entick, the court denounced the use of a general warrant to search for papers, holding that
a magistrate's issuance of general warrants constituted a trespass that was impermissible
without a specific grant of power. Id. at 818.
32. LASSON, supra note 25, at 51. As an example, Professor Lasson cites the use of
writs of assistance by British custom agents in enforcing the Molasses Act of 1733 against
suspected smugglers. Id. at 51-54.
33. James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy For Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HAsTnNGs L.J. 645, 646 n.4 (1985)
(noting that the Fourth Amendment was the result of colonial resentment of the "arbitrariness and oppression" of general warrants).
34. LASSON, supra note 25, at 120.
35. See generally REx D. DAvis, FEDERAL SEAcms AND SnizuREs 43-96 (1964)
(discussing general requirements of federal search warrants under Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and judicial interpretations of the rule).
Even though the requirements under Rule 41 may in fact be quite different from other
state search warrant requirements, this Note shall focus solely on the requirements for
federal search warrants found in Rule 41 because all of the reported cases involving surreptitious search warrants to date have been executed pursuant to federal warrants.
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istrate 36 showing that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been or is going to be committed, and that evidence related to the
commission or intended
commission of the crime can be found at a
7
specified location.3
Once the issuing magistrate or judge is satisfied that grounds for
the warrant application exist, that magistrate or judge may issue a
warrant identifying the property to be seized and describing the specific place to be searched to find the identified property.3 8 While the
issuing authority may explicitly specify the time for the execution of
the warrant,39 "it is generally left to the discretion of the executing
officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant. '40 After executing the
warrant, the agents must leave a receipt for all property seized under
the warrant and a copy of the warrant at the premises searched, as
well as promptly return
to the issuing authority a written inventory of
all property seized. 41
C. Surreptitious Search Warrants
While this Note discusses in Part IV the particular reasons why
the government prefers to use surreptitious search warrants instead of
conventional search warrants in certain circumstances, 42 several general observations about surreptitious search warrants should be noted
here. A surreptitious43 search is generally understood as a search of
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b). See also DAvis, supra note 35, at 48-49.
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
39. See FED. R. CRm. P. 41(c)(1) (explaining that "[t]he warrant shall be served in the
daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than the daytime").
40. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979) (footnote omitted).
41. Section (d) of Rule 41, which specifies the guidelines for execution and return of
search warrants, states:
The officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom
or from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from
which the property was taken. The return shall be made promptly and shall be
accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken. The inventory shall
be made in the presence of the applicant for the warrant and the person from
whose possession or premises the property was taken, if they are present, or in
the presence of at least one credible person other than the applicant for the warrant or the person from whose possession or premises the property was taken,
and shall be verified by the officer. The federal magistrate judge shall upon request deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from whom or from whose
premises the property was taken and to the applicant for the warrant.
FED. R. CR mI.P. 41(d).
42. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
43. "Surreptitious" is defined as something "done, made, or acquired by stealth."
WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1977).
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property without the consent or knowledge of the owners or occupants of the property.44 Surreptitious searches are often referred to as
secret searches, 45 covert searches, 46 or "sneak-and-peek" searches. 47
Surreptitious searches differ from conventional searches envisioned
under the Fourth Amendment in that they do not contemplate a
seizure of evidence.48 Instead, agents executing surreptitious search
warrants often employ them in order to enter a residence or property
when the owner or occupant is not present and observe the interior of
the residence to confirm whatever suspicions the agents might have
about illegal activity. Surreptitious searches also differ from conventional searches under the Fourth Amendment because, unlike other
types of searches,49 the owners or occupants of the searched property
may be unaware that a search has taken place until long after the
search has been completed. 50
Because the text of the Fourth Amendment reveals little about
the constitutionality of surreptitious search warrants, courts have focused on applying the Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause to
the surreptitious search context in an attempt to devise standards for
the execution of surreptitious search warrants and post-search no44. Gail Armist, Note, Freitas after Villegas: Are "Sneak-and-Peek" Search Warrants
ClandestineFishing Expeditions?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 933, 934-35 (1989).
45. Id.
46. Walker, supra note 14, at 545-47. See Kevin Corr, Sneaky but Lawfub The Use of
Sneak and Peek Search Warrants,43 KAN. L. REv. 1103, 1103 (1995).
47. See infra note 92.
48. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEizuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.12, at 360 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (noting that surreptitious entry
warrants authorize agents to "enter certain premises and look around (but not take anything) during the occupant's absence"). See also Walker, supra note 14, at 547 (discussing
the fact that a court when issuing warrants for covert searches, may "explicitly command
agents to search for property without disturbing it").
49. LAFAvE, supra note 48, § 4.8, at 270 (explaining that, in conventional searches,
"[iut is generally required that officers armed with a search warrant give notice of their
authority and purpose prior to entry of the premises to be searched").
50. Surreptitious searches executed pursuant to a warrant, the subject of this Note,
should also be distinguished from other warrantless searches sometimes referred to as
"surreptitious entry" searches and other searches colloquially described as "surreptitious
searches." See, e.g., William F. Brown and Americo R. Cinquegrana, WarrantlessPhysical
Searches ForForeign Intelligence Purposes:Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CAT. U. L. REv. 97, 103 (1985) (describing warrantless physical "surreptitious
entry" searches for foreign intelligence gathering purposes); George Lardner, Jr., Intelligence Panel's Secrecy Criticized ACLU Says Bill Authorizing Searches Should Be Dealt
With Openly, WAsH. PosT, August 1, 1990, at A17 (describing American Civil Liberties
Union's objection to Senate legislation providing for secret court authorization of "surreptitious searches" in national security context); Craig M. Bradley, CriminalProcedurein the
"Land of Oz": Lessons For America, 81 J. CRnm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 118-19 n.120
(1990) (discussing Australian criminal case where evidence was suppressed because a "surreptitious search" of hotel room was conducted without a warrant).
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tice.5 1 Notably, as the discussion of cases in Part II indicates, the
question of the constitutionality of surreptitious search warrants does
not require an analysis of the Warrants Clause, since these searches
are necessarily executed pursuantto a warrant. The issue instead becomes a question of what standards should exist in order for surreptitious search warrants to be executed in a manner consistent with the
dictates of the Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause of the
Fourth Amendment.
H. The Treatment of Surreptitious Search Warrants by
the Courts
A. Ninth Circuit Cases

(1) United States v. Freitas
The first reported instance of the use of a surreptitious search
warrant occurred in United States v. Freitas.52 In late July 1984 an
anonymous informant telephoned the Drug Enforcement Administraa
tion (DEA) and indicated that Raymond Freitas was operating
53
methamphetamine laboratory at his Clearlake, California home. In
mid-August, the same informant contacted the DEA, explaining that
Freitas also had a home in Oakland and that Freitas had used a GMC
Blazer truck to transport chemicals and glassware to the Clearlake
residence.5 4 In October 1984 Clearlake sheriffs notified the DEA that
Freitas' Clearlake neighbors had complained that "strong chemical
odors" had been emanating from Freitas' home, and that local law
enforcement officers had observed hoses running from Freitas' home
to the lake. 55
After a series of calls in November and early December during
which the informant told the DEA that Freitas would soon begin producing methamphetanine, the informant told the DEA on December
9, 1984 that Freitas had begun to assemble equipment for the manu51. For examples of this approach, see infra Part H.
52. United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and remanded,
800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). In reaching his decision in the case, District Court Judge
Lynch observed that the surreptitious search issue was one of first impression. Id. at 1569
(observing that "[n]either the parties nor this Court have been able to locate a single reported case involving a warrant of the type executed" for the Freitas residence).
53. Id. at 1563-64. The DEA had reason to believe the informant, since Freitas had
previously been arrested in May 1980 for importing seven pounds of cocaine and again in

January 1982 for attempting to involve his brother-in-law in a methamphetamine-making
scheme. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1452.
54. Id.

55. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. at 1565. In his opinion for the majority on appeal, Judge
Sneed explained that "[b]oth the odors and the hoses are signs of a methamphetamine
laboratory." Freitas,800 F.2d at 1452.
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facture of methamphetamine. 56 On that same day, agents following
Freitas observed that he and other members of his party had loaded
equipment and had purchased large blocks of ice commonly used in
the manufacture of methamphetamine 5 7
Based upon the information supplied by the informant and the
DEA's own observations, DEA agent Stephen Wood applied for and
obtained eight search warrants from the supervising magistrate on December 12, 1984.58 The warrants permitted DEA agents to search
Freitas' Clearlake residence, his Oakland home, and six storage lockers. 59 In addition to the eight warrants, special agent Laura Hayes
applied for a "surreptitious entry" warrant for the Clearlake residence. 60 Under the terms of the warrant, the agents were permitted
to enter the home while no one was around, inspect the interior, and
leave without disturbing anything. 61 Hayes explained in her supporting affidavit that such a surreptitious entry would help the DEA "determine the status of the suspected clandestine methamphetamine
laboratory." 62 In issuing the warrant, the magistrate used a conventional warrant form, but the magistrate eliminated from the warrant a
description of the property to be seized and the requirement that copies of the warrant and an inventory of the property taken be left at the
Clearlake home. 63 Significantly, the warrant did not contain any requirement that notice be given to Freitas that his property had been
searched, nor did the warrant set forth the necessity for a surreptitious
entry. 64
Agents executed the surreptitious search warrant on the evening
of December 13, 1984.65 On December 17, the government successfully applied for an extension (until December 26, 1984) on the previous eight search warrants. 66 On December 20, 1984, DEA agents
56. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1453.
57. Id. Agents also confirmed that hoses were indeed running from Freitas' Clearlake
residence to a lake, and that the windows on the ground floor of the home were covered.
Id.
58. Id. These original eight warrants were to expire on December 16, 1984.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61.

Id.

62. Id. (quoting from an excerpt of the record at trial).
63. Id.
64. Id. See infra Parts IV.A. and IV.B. for a discussion of the requirement of necessity in the surreptitious search warrant context.

65. Id. During their surreptitious search, agents observed extensive laboratory equipment and chemicals commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Freitas,610
F. Supp. at 1564; see supra note 5. A partial list of those items observed by the agents was
supplied to the supervising magistrate. Id.
66. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1453.
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the search warseized evidence at the Clearlake home pursuant to
67
rants that had been extended and arrested Freitas.
During his trial, Freitas moved to suppress the evidence seized
from the December 20 search on the grounds that it was tainted by the
unconstitutional surreptitious search on December 13.68 The trial
court held that the lack of notice in the warrant and the lack of a
showing of necessity in the affidavit made the surreptitious search
warrant constitutionally infirm. 69 Because the extensions for the December 12 warrants and the December 20 search itself resulted at least
13 unconstiin part from information obtained during the December
70
tutional search, the seized evidence was suppressed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the surreptitious entry
warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not explicitly
provide for notice "within a reasonable, but short, time subsequent to
the surreptitious entry. '71 While noting that as a general matter the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit surreptitious entries, 72 the court
expressed concern that the absence of a notice requirement in the
warrant rendered the warrant unconstitutional. 73 The court concluded that the time period subsequent to a search during which notice should be provided to the owner or resident of the searched
property "should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing
of necessity." 74 In justifying its ruling that the failure to include notice
within such a reasonable time was a constitutional defect, the court
observed:
[S]urreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very
heart of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. The
mere thought of strangers walking through and visually examining
67. Id.
68. Freitas,610 F. Supp. at 1568-73. Freitas also challenged the validity of the eight
search warrants issued on December 12, 1984 (on the basis that the Wood affidavit contained insufficient facts to support probable cause), the reliability of the informant, and
alleged misrepresentations and omissions in the Wood affidavit. The trial court rejected all
of these challenges. Id. at 1564-68.
69. Id. at 1570-71. The "notice" to which the court was referring was the requirement
under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to leave a receipt of property
taken and a copy of the executed warrant at the premises searched. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. Presumably, the owner or resident of searched property would receive
notice of the search if provided with a copy of the warrant.
70. Id. at 1573. The trial court relied on the reasoning in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984), and Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) that challenged evidence is subject to suppression if it is the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 1569.
71. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456.
72. Id. (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,247 (1979), discussed infra in Part

Iii).
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Id.
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the center of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for
freedom as does nothing else. That passion.., demands that surreptitious entries be closely circumscribed. 75

Significantly, the court did not hold that a showing of necessity
was required. 76 Additionally, the court observed that the surreptitious
entry warrant possibly violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(d) 77 for failing to provide adequate notice. 78 Because the court ultimately found the surreptitious entry warrant unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment, it did not have to base its decision on any
case to determine
violation of Rule 41. The court then remanded the 79
whether a showing of "good faith" could be made.
On remand, the trial court again suppressed the evidence on the
basis that the evidence resulting from the surreptitious entry tainted
evidence from the December 20 conventional search.80 Upon the government's appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Freitas II concluded from its
independent review of the factual record that there was a sufficient
basis to believe that the agents' behavior was objectively reasonable in
75. Id.

76. Id. In holding that a showing of necessity was not constitutionally required, the
Ninth Circuit noted that such a showing of necessity "could have strengthened the claim
that the search and seizure in this case met the commands of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
77. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d) provides guidelines for federal agents
to observe in obtaining and executing warrants for searches and seizures. See supra note
41.
78. The court struggled to apply Rule 41(d) to a surreptitious warrant, suggesting that
legislative adjustments to Rule 41 to account for surreptitious warrants might be useful.
Freitas,800 F.2d at 1455-56.

79. Id. at 1457-58. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court
held that evidence need not be suppressed when agents have acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a warrant later found to be defective unless the affidavit supporting the
warrant is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable" (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part)), or the warrant is "so facially deficient ... that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23.
The district court was instructed, on remand, to make findings on four issues: (1)
whether the agents had heard of similar surreptitious entry warrants issued elsewhere; (2)
whether the agents had consulted with the United States Attorney; (3) whether the agents
discussed the surreptitious entry with the magistrate; and (4) whether similar warrants had
issued in other districts. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1457.
80. United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988). On remand, the
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, finding that the agents were neither aware
of similar warrants being issued in other districts, nor were such warrants actually issued in
other districts. Although the court did find that the agents had advised the supervising
magistrate of the special nature of the warrant and had obtained the advice of an Assistant
United States Attorney, the trial court concluded that "the flaw on the face of the warrant
in this case was so basic that no reasonably well-trained law enforcement officer could have
acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant." Id.
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executing the surreptitious search warrant. 8 1 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit held that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule
applied, and the evidence from the searches was admissible. 82
(2) United States v. Johns
Not long after Freitas,the Ninth Circuit had a second opportunity
to consider the constitutionality of surreptitious search warrants. 83 In
January 1985 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent John White
applied for a surreptitious search warrant to search a storage unit in
Kernville, California. 84 According to White's supporting affidavit,
Kern County Sheriff's officers had detected strong odors commonly
associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine coming from a
storage unit rented to George Johns. 85 Agent White obtained a warrant to surreptitiously enter the storage unit without disturbing any
evidence. 86 Federal agents executing the warrant shortly thereafter
observed chemicals and glassware utilized in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. 87 Based upon the evidence observed during the
surreptitious search, the government indicted Johns on April 5, 1985.88
During his trial, Johns entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 8 9 When he
learned of the district court's decision in Freitas,Johns moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for an evidentiary hearing on
the surreptitious search. 90 The district court refused to accept Johns'
81. Id. at 1431. The Ninth Circuit explained that the balancing involved in a Leon
"good faith" analysis is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo by appellate courts.
82. Id. at 1432.
83. United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), appeal after
remand, 948 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1226 (1992).
84. Id. at 1132.
85. Id. Agent White also stated in his supporting affidavit that he had learned that
"those who manufacture methamphetamine often utilize a mini storage warehouse to store
excess chemicals, glassware and other items utilized in the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine until the next time that they engage in the illicit methamphetamine
production." Id.
86. Id. As in Freitas,the agents used a standard search warrant with the requirements
of notice and receipt of property taken crossed out. Id. at 1134 n.2.
87. Id. at 1132.
88. Id.

89. Id. at 1133. Several weeks before entering his conditional plea of guilty, Johns

moved to suppress the evidence because the affidavit supporting the surreptitious warrant
allegedly included statements that were willfully or recklessly false. Id. at 1132. Johns'

motion was denied by the trial court, and he entered his conditional plea on April 28, 1986.
Id.
90. Id.
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argument that the covert nature of the warrant rendered it unconstitutional, and Johns received a ten year sentence.91
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Johns adopted the analytical
framework of Freitas in holding that the surreptitious search was unconstitutional. The Johns court explained that the "sneak-and-peek"92
warrant employed by the federal agents to search Johns' storage unit
was "indistinguishable" from the warrant in Freitas.93 Specifically, the
court observed that the warrant in Johns failed to provide for any
post-search notice, and thus was presumptively violative of the Fourth
Amendment absent a showing that the officers who executed the warrant acted in good faith in relying on the warrant.94 The court then
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the "good faith" exception applied. 95
On remand, the trial court held that the agents had in fact relied
on the warrant in good faith. 96 Defendant Johns then appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. In Johns II, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the redacted
affidavit provided a sufficient basis for probable cause to search the
storage unit.97 Unlike the Freitascourt, which questioned the application of Rule 41 to the surreptitious search context,98 the Johns II court
held that a warrant not providing for notice of a search is inconsistent
with Rule 41(d). 99 The court then explained that the failure to give
notice in Johns II was a "nonfundamental" violation of Rule 41 that
did not require automatic suppression of the evidence (as would a
"fundamental," or constitutional violation) because the agents had acted in "good faith" in relying on the warrant. 100 The Johns 11 court did
note, however, that the Freitasrule regarding the unconstitutionality
of warrants that fail to provide for post-search notice within seven
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1134. The Johns court was the first to refer to a surreptitious search warrant
as a "sneak-and-peek" warrant; the name evidently refers to the fact that such a warrant
permits federal agents to "sneak" into someone's property and "peek" at the contents of
the interior without the knowledge of the occupants or owners of the property.
93. Id. at 1135.
94. Id. See supra note 79 for discussion of the Leon "good faith" exception.
95. Id. at 1135. Johns argued that the agents did not act in good faith because they
failed to reveal in their affidavits supporting the surreptitious search warrant that the

source of their information about the storage unit was an informant. The Ninth Circuit
noted that the incomplete record did not provide sufficient information to decide this ques-

tion, and thus remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id.
96. United States v. Johns, 948 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S.
1226 (1992). The trial court held that the White affidavit, redacted of any false statements

or misrepresentations, supported a finding of probable cause. Further, the agents had relied on the warrant after consulting with an Assistant United States Attorney. Id.
97. Id. at 603.
98. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
99. Johns, 948 F.2d at 603.

100. Id. at 604-07.
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days would be binding: "We wish to make it clear that deliberate disregard of [the Freitas] rule will indicate to reviewing courts that the
warrant should never have been issued, and will render inapplicable
the good faith exception."''1 Thus, after Johns 11,all law enforcement
agents and magistrates would presumably be aware of the seven-day
rule, and would be unable to claim a good faith ignorance of the Ninth
Circuit's standard for the execution of surreptitious search
warrants. 0 2
(3) United States v. Sitton
In the only other Ninth Circuit case to address this issue, United
States v. Sitton, 03 the court declined to directly comment on the appropriate standard for post-search notice.
In mid-1990 officers from the Inyo County Sheriff's Department
and the Bureau of Land Management caught a group of individuals
illegally producing methamphetamine in a box canyon at Death Valley
National Monument. 1' After discovering a truck registered to Ronald Dewbre in the box canyon, 0 5 San Bernardino County sheriffs put
Dewbre under surveillance. 0 6 During their surveillance, sheriffs observed Dewbre and a co-defendant enter a storage unit in Fontana,
California. 0 7 The sheriffs obtained and executed a surreptitious
search warrant for the unit.10 8 Inside, the sheriffs found equipment
and chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, weapons, and
a drum of waste liquid which tested positive for methamphetamine. 0 9
Agents later executed conventional warrants to search other storage
units and the homes of other co-defendants involved in the conspiracy
before arresting Dewbre and a number of others." 0
During his trial, Dewbre sought to suppress the evidence gained
from the surreptitious search of the storage unit."' Dewbre argued
that the search warrant did not contain a post-search notice provision
101. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. 968 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993).
104. Id. at 952. The law enforcement agents found glassware, chemical containers,
weapons, and about five pounds of methamphetamine at the location of the arrest.
105. Id. at 955.

106. Id. at 952.
107. Id.

108. Id. Notably, the surreptitious warrant to search the unit provided for notice any
time within ten days of execution. Id. at 956.
109. Id. at 952.
110. Id. at 952-53. Dewbre, along with other codefendants, was indicted on a range of
charges, including conspiracy to manufacture and to possess methamphetamine with the
intent to distribute. Id. at 952.
111. Id. at 955. In addition to challenging the surreptitious search, Dewbre argued at
trial that the supporting affidavit contained a materially false statement. After conducting
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conforming to the Freitas requirements. 112 The district court agreed
that the warrant was invalid under Freitas,but still denied Dewbre's
suppression motion because the district113
court found that the agents
had relied in good faith on the warrant.
The Ninth Circuit adopted a different analysis. Instead of addressing the question of whether the surreptitious warrant was unconstitutional for failing to provide for reasonable post-search notice, the
court concluded that the evidence seized from the later conventional
warrants
was not the result of the surreptitious search of the storage
unit.1 4 The Ninth Circuit determined that there was no evidence that
the decision to seek the conventional warrant was based upon any
information gained from the surreptitious search; if the statements
containing information learned from the surreptitious search were redacted from the supporting affidavit, there was still sufficient probable
cause to secure the later conventional warrants.11 5 Thus, the Sitton
court effectively dodged the question of whether a surreptitious
search warrant not providing for post-search notice in accordance with
Freitas was constitutional.
B. Second Circuit Cases

By the time that the Second Circuit faced its first surreptitious
search warrant case in 1990, the Ninth Circuit had already explained
in a series of cases that surreptitious search warrants lacking postsearch notice within seven days violated the Fourth Amendment. As
the discussion below indicates, however, the Second Circuit did not
completely endorse all of the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit. While
adopting some of the specific standards from Freitas,the Second Ciran evidentiary hearing on the issue, the district court found that the statement challenged
by Dewbre was not false, and if false was not made deliberately or recklessly. Id.
112. Id. at 956.
113. Id. This reasoning might seem surprising in light of the Johns II court's statement
that the good faith exception could no longer be applied after Freitas had clearly established the standard for post-search notice. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
The distinguishing characteristic in Sitton is that the surreptitious warrant was issued
by a state, and not a federal, judge. See Decl. of Sergeant Del Wiedman, in Government's
Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Evid., 11 6-7 (No. 90-590-ER) (on file with author)
(describing how officers were advised by district attorney's office that notice of surreptitious entry within ten days would be sufficient). As a result, the presumption of awareness
of the seven-day post-search notice requirement did not apply.
114. Sitton, 968 F.2d at 956.
115. Id. The court explained that "[s]tanding alone, the affidavit supporting the conventional search, with all references to the surreptitious search redacted, may not have
contained sufficient information to establish probable cause. However, attached to that
affidavit... was an earlier affidavit supporting the surreptitious entry warrant. That earlier
affidavit amply establishedprobablecause independent of the surreptitioussearch." (emphasis added). Id
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cuit's analysis of the constitutionality of surreptitious search warrants
fundamentally differed from that of the Ninth Circuit.
(1)

United States v. Villegas

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that Ricardo Villegas was producing cocaine at his New York farm, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents began surveillance of the Villegas
farm. 116 On May 12, 1987, DEA agents applied for a surreptitious
search warrant to confirm the presence of the illegal cocaine production. 11 7 In the affidavit supporting the request for the surreptitious
warrant, DEA agents revealed that their investigation of the Villegas
farm had yielded additional information supporting the informant's
tips that a cocaine factory was operating on the premises.1 18 Agents
executed the surreptitious search warrant on May 13, 1987.119 Two
months later, agents obtained and executed a conventional search
warrant. 120 During the conventional search, agents seized large quantities of cocaine in various stages of production and arrested Villegas
2
and ten others.' '
During their trial, the defendants argued that the surreptitious
search was a "fishing expedition" because there was no seizure of
property.' 22 The defendants claimed that the surreptitious search violated Fourth Amendment protections, and that the lack of a meaningful "return"' 23 of the warrant violated Rule 41(d). 24 Noting that the
Second Circuit had not yet addressed a case involving surreptitious
searches, 25 the trial court looked for assistance to the standards developed by the Ninth Circuit in Freitasand its progeny regarding reasonable post-search notice. 26 The court found the warrant before it
distinguishable from the one considered by the Ninth Circuit in Freitas.' 27 The Villegas warrant explicitly provided for post-search notice
116. United States v. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. 94,99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 899 F.2d 1324
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990).
117. Id. The agents requested authorization to search the farm in order "to take photographs but not physically to seize any tangible items of evidence." Villegas, 899 F2d at
1330.
118. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. at 99.
119. Id. at 96. During the search, agents observed equipment and chemicals necessary
for the manufacture of cocaine. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1331.
120. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. at 96.
121. Id. The defendants were charged with possessing, manufacturing, and distributing
cocaine, as well as conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine.
122. Id. at 97.
123. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
124. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. at 97.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 97-98.
127. Id. at 98.
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within seven days, and was thus sufficient to "pass constitutional muster" under Freitas.128 Further, the trial court observed that the supporting affidavit made a sufficient showing of necessity, which tended
to strengthen the claim that the warrant was constitutional. 129 Finally,
the trial court found no violation of Rule 41 because the agents had
obtained eight extensions on the filing of the return, each of which
was supported by a showing of necessity.130
On appeal, Villegas again argued for suppression of the seized
evidence on the grounds that it was the product of an unconstitutional
search.' 31 In language suggesting greater tolerance than the Ninth
Circuit towards surreptitious searches, the Second Circuit observed
that
[c]ertain types of searches or surveillances depend for their success
on the absence of premature disclosure. The use of a wiretap, or a
"bug," or a pen register, or a video camera would likely produce
little evidence of wrongdoing if the wrongdoers knew in advance
that their conversations or actions would be monitored. When nondisclosure of the authorized search is essential to its success, neither
Rule 41 nor the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry.' 32

Comparing surreptitious searches to other court-sanctioned
searches, the Second Circuit concluded that surreptitious search warrants lacking provisions for contemporaneous notice were permissible. 33 The Villegas court then explained, however, that some
safeguards should be provided where authorized covert entries envision the seizure of intangible property. 34 These safeguards were nec128. Id.
129. Id. The affidavit specifically explained that covert physical surveillance of the
farm was difficult because of its remote location, surveillance of the phone was ineffective
because of infrequent use by the inhabitants of the farm, no informant was able to infiltrate
the operation, and numerous coconspirators had not yet been identified. Villegas, 899 F.2d
at 1330.
130. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. at 98.
131. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1333. The defendants also argued that the surreptitious
search warrant was unlawful under Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment because it authorized a search without a seizure of tangible property (Le., the search only sought "information" regarding the status of a criminal enterprise, and thus sought only intangible
property). Id. at 1334.
The Second Circuit summarily dismissed this argument and decided that both Rule 41
and the Fourth Amendment extend to searches for, and seizures of, intangible items. The
court relied principally on United States v. New York Tel., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977) (explaining that "Rule 41 is not limited to tangible items but is sufficiently flexible to include
within its scope electronic intrusions authorized upon a finding of probable cause") and a
series of Supreme Court cases approving of seizures of intangible evidence in the context
of the interception of communications. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1334-35.
132. Id. at 1336 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) and Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), both of which are discussed infra in Part III).
133. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1336.
134. Id.
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essary to balance individual privacy and property interests against
legitimate law enforcement interests, thus minimizing the chance that
law enforcement will "exceed the bounds of propriety without detection.' u3 5 The court held that two limitations on the issuance of surreptitious search warrants were necessary: a showing of "reasonable
necessity" by the officers seeking the warrant for delaying notice; and
post-search notice within a reasonable time after the search. 136 While
conceding that a "reasonable time" may depend on the particular
facts of a case, the court agreed with the Freitascourt that "as an initial matter, the issuing court
should not authorize a notice delay of
37
longer than seven days.'
Thus, while adopting the Ninth Circuit's idea that reasonable
post-search notice should not exceed seven days (at least as a preliminary matter), the Second Circuit did not explicitly accept the Ninth
Circuit's underlying reasoning that the Fourth Amendment and Rule
41 compelled notice in the surreptitious search context. Instead of
finding that the Fourth Amendment or Rule 41 dictated some form of
notice, the Second Circuit based its holding on the idea that a balancing of individual and government interests necessitated some form of
reasonable post-search notice. 38
(2) United States v. Pangburn
Upon reconsideration of the question of surreptitious search warrants several years later, the Second Circuit departed even further
from the Ninth Circuit's approach. In early 1989 federal DEA agents
in Rochester, New York, contacted Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement
(BNE) agents from the California Department of Justice regarding an
investigation of the trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 139 DEA agents had learned that a
Rochester chemical company was shipping large quantities of
methamphetamine precursors to various individuals in California, in135. Id. at 1336-37.
136. Id at 1337. In requiring a showing of "reasonable necessity" for delaying notice to
an owner or resident of a searched property, the court noted that it did not mean to suggest
that "the officers must meet as rigorous a standard as that imposed by Title III." Title I,
which applies in electronic surveillance cases, requires a heightened showing of necessity.
See infra Part III.
137. Id. The Second Circuit noted, however, that extensions of the period for delay of
notice may be granted by the issuing court upon a clear showing of the need for further
delay. Id.
138. Id. at 1337-38. Although it did not so specify, the Villegas court's authority to
fashion a quasi-constitutional seven-day post-search notice requirement comes from a
court's generally recognized power to define the constitutional limits of governmental
power. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1975).
139. United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1993).
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cluding Frank Salcido.140 While carrying forth the investigation at the
request of the DEA, an informant contacted BNE agents and supplied
information concerning Salcido's connection with the precursor chemicals. 141 BNE agents, who had begun surveillance of Salcido, observed
Salcido pick up the chemicals from a suspected drug manufacturing
facility and take them to a storage facility. 142 Based on the informant's tip, the surveillance, Salcido's previous arrests for possession of
narcotics, and Salcido's suspected involvement in large-scale drug trafficking schemes, a BNE agent applied before a California municipal
court judge for a surreptitious search warrant to search a storage
locker suspected to be used by Salcido. 143 BNE agents executed the
warrant on April 19, 1989, and photographed boxes containing various
precursor chemicals. 144 The warrant did not require the executing
agents to provide any notice to Salcido, but BNE agents did properly
return the warrant to the issuing judge. 145
After conducting a controlled delivery of ephedrine (a precursor
chemical), BNE agents sought a second surreptitious warrant to
search the same storage locker. 146 The second warrant, which also dispensed with any notice requirement, was issued and executed on May
9, 1989.147 Finally, agents executed a conventional search warrant in
early August, and BNE agents seized methamphetamine precursor
chemicals from the Salcido locker.14s Based upon the evidence seized,
Salcido and seven others were charged in a seventy-eight count indictment in New York with various crimes relating to methamphetamine
precursor trafficking. 149
Salcido moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the
three warrants. 50 A magistrate judge agreed that the two surreptitious warrants violated the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 for failing
to include a post-search notice provision, but then denied the suppres140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The warrant authorized the agents executing the warrant to search the storage
locker without requiring the agents conducting the search to leave a copy of the warrant or
an inventory of items photographed at the locker. According to the warrant, "[a]ny disclosure would impede the investigation of a suspected felony." Id.
146. Id. at 451. In the affidavit supporting this second request for a surreptitious
search warrant, a BNE agent described the results of the previous search (and, specifically,
that there was no legitimate use of the amount of chemicals observed in the storage locker)
and his suspicion that the controlled delivery chemicals were at the storage locker. Id.
147. Id.

148. Id. at 452.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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sion motion because the executing agents relied in good faith upon the
warrant. 151 The district court, however, found the record inadequate
to support a finding of good faith reliance and instructed the magistrate judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the good faith
question. 152
After conducting the requested hearing, the magistrate judge
concluded that the executing agents should have known that surreptitious search warrants lacking post-search notice within seven days
were invalid absent a showing of good cause. 53 As a result, the evidence seized pursuant to the conventional warrant was suppressed as
54
"the derivative fruit" of the illegal surreptitious search warrants.
The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation
and ordered suppression of the evidence. 155
The government appealed the suppression of evidence. In a departure from other courts that had dealt with surreptitious searches,
the Second Circuit in Pangburnstated that "[n]o provision specifically
requiring notice of the execution of a search warrant is included in the
Fourth Amendment.' 56 The court also stated that, while Rule 41 requires notice of a search, it does not prescribe when notice should be
given.' 57 As the Villegas court had done, the Pangburncourt relied on
previous Supreme Court 58cases that had expressly authorized other
types of covert searches.
Observing that the Villegas court had not adopted the Freitastheory that a warrant is "constitutionally defective" if it lacks a provision
for notice, the Pangburncourt held that a post-search notice requirement is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment. 159 Instead, the
Pangburncourt decided that the requirement of notice has its roots in
151.
152.
drafted
in light
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. The district court explained that "it is not clear whether the officers who
and executed those warrants took reasonable precautions to assure their validity"
of the requirements of Freitas. Id.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

158. For discussion of the Villegas court's reasoning, see supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
In Pangburn,the Second Circuit relied primarily on the principle set forth in Dalia
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry. Pangbum,983 F.2d at
453 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979)). The Second Circuit then
noted that the Supreme Court in Katz had found no requirement in Rule 41 that officers
executing a warrant must announce their search if the announcement would cause the escape of a suspect or the destruction of evidence. Pangburn,983 F.2d at 453 (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347,355 n.16 (1967)). For a more extended discussion of Dalia and
Katz, see infra Part III.
159. Pangbum, 983 F.2d at 454-55.
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Rule 41.160 The Second Circuit then explained that, in the absence of
a showing of intentional disregard of the requirement of notice, or of
prejudice to the owner or resident of searched property, evidence
gained from a surreptitious search will not be suppressed where the
warrant does not provide for notice. 161 Thus, the Pangburncourt not
only rejected the Freitas reasoning that notice is a constitutional requirement, but it also suggested that a warrant lacking a notice provision is presumptively valid absent a showing of intentional disregard
for the notice requirement or prejudice to the owner or resident of
searched property. The Second Circuit then reversed and remanded
the case under its newly described test.162
IH. Notice as a Requirement for Fourth Amendment
Searches
The Second Circuit's opinions in Villegas and Pangburn, when
compared with the Ninth Circuit's approach to surreptitious search
warrants in Freitas and its progeny, demonstrate that there is fundamental disagreement about the appropriate legal standards that
should apply to the issuance and execution of surreptitious search
warrants. While Villegas tacitly accepted the Ninth Circuit's seven163
day post-search notice requirement as enunciated in Freitas, it
failed to explicitly adopt the idea that the Fourth Amendment creates
a constitutional requirement of notice for surreptitious searches. The
Pangburn court more clearly expressed the Second Circuit's disapproval with the Freitas line of reasoning, explaining that the Fourth
Amendment could not be read to require notice for surreptitious
searches.' 64
Assuming that the Fourth Amendment establishes a test of "reasonableness" in determining whether a given search is constitutional,165 the Freitas rule that post-search notice is a constitutional
requirement can only be accepted if the concept of "reasonableness"
under the Fourth Amendment can be understood to include a requirement of notice. The analysis that follows demonstrates that such an
understanding is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court.
160. Id. at 455. "We prefer to root our notice requirement in the provisions of Rule 41,
rather than in the somewhat amorphous Fourth Amendment 'interests' concept developed
by the FreitasI court." Id.
161. Id. (citing the test for a Rule 41 violation suggested by Judge Friendly in United
States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975)).
162. Id.
163. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337.
164. Pangbum, 983 F.2d at 454-55.
165. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, neither the language of Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Supreme Court's interpretation
of its function suggests that Rule 41 compels the seven-day postsearch notice requirement articulated by the Ninth (and, to a lesser
extent, by the Second) Circuit.
A. The Development of the Concept of Notice
(1) Common Law Origins of the Concept of Notice
The general principle that notice is required when conducting a
search can be traced to the decision in Semayne's Case in 1603.166 In
Semayne's Case, the court explained the rule as follows:
In all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not
open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do
execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But
before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to
make request to open the doors. .

. .167

Founding-era commentators agreed that notice seemed to be a
requirement when conducting a search. Sir William Blackstone explained that a sheriff may justify "breaking open doors" if "the possession be not quietly delivered.' 168 Sir Matthew Hale noted that the
"constant practice" at common law was for the officer to break open
the door "if he be sure the offender is there, [and] if after acquainting
[the residents] of the business, and demanding the prisoner, [the prisoner] refuses to open the door."'1 69 Similarly, William Hawkins observed that an officer was permitted to break open the door of a
dwelling in cases of necessity, but the officer must "first signify to
those in the house70the cause of his coming, and request them to give
him admittance.'
The common law notice requirement quickly became a part of
early American law. Most of the states that ratified the Fourth
Amendment had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes incor166. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
167. 5 Co. Rep. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195 (emphasis added). Although Semayne's
Case involved the execution of a civil writ, it has been widely accepted as establishing an
appropriate standard for application in the criminal context when executing criminal
search warrants. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supranote 48, § 4.8(a), at 270-71; Note, Announcement
in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 142-43 & n.17 (1970).
168. 3 WnLIAM BLAcCsrO N, COMMENTARmS *412. It is perhaps important to note
that search warrants were probably not contemplated by Blackstone, and that the quoted
language likely referred to arrest warrants. For the purposes of this Note, however, the
requirement of some form of announcement or notice preceding an arrest warrant may be
applied by analogy to search warrants.
169. 1 MATrHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRowN *582 (1736).
170. 2 WILLIAM HAWKiNS, PLEAS OF THE CRowN, ch.14, § 1, at 138 (6th ed. 1788).
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porating English common law. 171 These statutory and constitutional
provisions, coupled with the fact that colonial writs of assistance often
included notice requirements, rapidly led American courts to rely on
172
the principle that searches generally required some form of notice.
(2) Exceptions to the Notice Rule
The idea that notice was an element of a search was not, however,
an inflexible rule. As early as the colonial period, American courts
recognized that circumstances could exist where the failure to provide
advance or contemporaneous notice would be excused. 173 Over time,
courts recognized three exceptions where notice was not required: the
"danger to person" exception; the "destruction of evidence" exception; and the "useless gesture" exception. 174
The first two exceptions are especially relevant to the surreptitious search context. Under the "danger to person" exception, entry
without notice to execute a search warrant is permissible when notice
would increase the risk of physical violence to officers executing the
warrant or inhabitants of the searched premises.' 75 The early American case of Read v. Case176 was among the first to formally recognize
this exception. More recently, the Supreme Court has relied on the
theoretical underpinnings of this exception in allowing a variety177of different Fourth Amendment searches without requiring notice.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the common law exception to the notice requirement where there is a belief that the destruction of evidence is likely. Under this exception, officers are excused
from the usual notice requirement when they are reasonably acting to
171. See LAssON, supra note 25, at 51-78 (describing various state statutes adopting
English common law).
172.

Note, Announcement in Police Entries,supra note 167, at 144-45 & n.25 ("The act

creating the writs of assistance granted the right of forcible entry to a customs official
carrying the writ.").
173. LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 4.8(a)-(c), at 270-77.
174. Id. § 4.8(d)-(f), at 280-87.
175. Id. § 4.8(e), at 284.
176. 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822) (noting that presumption in favor of announcement would
yield under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence).
177. In its most recent case examining Fourth Amendment searches, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized this exception. Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918-19
(1995).
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court implicitly relied on this exception in permitting police officers to "stop and frisk" suspects for weapons without a warrant or probable cause. Id. at 20-27.
Similar reliance on the idea that searches should be executed to decrease threats of
physical violence can be found in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,762-64 (1969) (permitting warrantless searches incident to arrest of arrestee's person and area within arrestee's
"immediate control" both to protect police safety and to prevent the destruction of
evidence).
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prevent the destruction or disposal of items named in a warrant.1 78
The Supreme Court expressly recognized this exception in Ker v. California, where the plurality described the destruction of evidence as a
judicially-crafted exigent circumstance. 179 In holding that the exception applied in Ker because of the particular facts of the case, the
Court seemed to suggest that a specific showing of a reasonable belief
of the destruction of evidence, and not just mere expediency, would
be required in order to assert this exception. In some situations, the
Supreme Court has broadened the scope of potential uses for this exception and has even upheld warrantless searches in order to avoid
the imminent destruction of evidence. 180
Under the third "useless gesture" exception, law enforcement officers may forego the giving of notice prior to conducting a search
where it is evident from the circumstances that the target of the search
is aware of the authority and purpose of the officers.18 ' In such a situation, providing notice would only be a "superfluous act."' 82 This exception is sometimes more narrowly construed as an exception
allowing an officer to dispense with notice in cases where a prisoner
escapes from the officer and retreats to his dwelling. 8 3 For the purposes of this Note, however, the "useless gesture" exception has little
relevance. Because the targets of surreptitious search warrants presumably do not know that they are under surveillance, 8 4 they could
not possibly be aware of the authority or purpose of any search. Not
surprisingly, therefore, none of the reported surreptitious search war178. LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 4.8(d), at 280.
179. 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963) (plurality opinion). In Ker, the police entered Ker's house
without providing any notice of their authority or purpose. Id.at 28. The police argued,
and the Court ultimately accepted, that Ker had employed evasive tactics that led police
officers to believe that Ker was expecting the police and thus would have disposed of evidence (narcotics) if forewarned. Id. at 40.
While Ker involved an arrest warrant, it has been applied more broadly to the search
warrant context. LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 4.8(a), at 271.
180. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970), for example, the Court permitted a warrantless search of a seized automobile because the automobile was mobile and
thus there was a higher risk of loss of evidence.
For an overview of the Supreme Court's recognition of this exception in the warrantless search context, see Linda H. Mullenbach, WarrantlessResidentialSearches to Prevent
the Destruction of Evidence: A Need for Strict Standards,70 J. CRIM. L. & CrIMINOLOGY
255 (1979).
181. LAFAvE, supra note 48, § 4.8(f), at 286-87.
182. Id.
183. See Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300,304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (holding that it would
be "senseless ceremony" to require an officer to announce his presence before breaking
into a dwelling to apprehend an escapee); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298300 (1967) (recognizing common law exception that suspect cannot retreat into own dwelling merely to avoid arrest).
184. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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rant cases has involved a fact185pattern suggesting the application of the
"useless gesture" exception.
(3) The Role of Notice in the Supreme Court's Interpretationof the Fourth
Amendment
Consideration of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides little explicit guidance for determining the constitutional dimensions of the notice requirement. As Professor LaFave
has observed, "the United States Supreme Court has not had occasion
to rule specifically upon the question of whether the Fourth Amendment compels that notice ordinarily be given in the execution of a
search warrant."' 186 In the absence of a Supreme Court decision specifying whether notice is a requirement under the Fourth Amendment,
one is left to draw conclusions from analogous factual scenarios where
the Court has addressed the constitutional requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Several aspects of the Court's approach to Fourth
Amendment searches lead to the conclusion that, while notice may be
considered as a factor contributingto the reasonablenessof a particular
search, notice is not constitutionally required.
First, the number of exceptions to the common law notice requirement that the Supreme Court has recognized 187 strongly suggests
that the Court does not view notice as the determinative factor in deciding whether a particular search is constitutional (as the Ninth Circuit concludes in Freitas). Significantly, Professor LaFave has noted
that the requirement of notice "became the generally accepted common law rule in this country,' 88 and not a constitutional rule enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. If the Court indeed believed that
notice was constitutionally mandated, and that the lack of notice rendered a particular search unconstitutional, one might reasonably ask
why the Court has not so specified. Nothing about the Supreme
Court's treatment of the exceptions to the general common law rule of
notice inexorably leads to the conclusion that notice was anything
more than one of a number of factors that should be balanced in judging the constitutionality of a search.
Second, the Supreme Court has consistently explained that
Fourth Amendment searches pass constitutional muster whenever
they are reasonable, and has never interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require notice. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United
185. See supra discussion in Part II.
186. LAFAvE, supra note 48, § 4.8(a), at 271.
187. See supra Part II.A.(2).
188. LAFAvE, supra note 48, § 4.8(a), at 271 (emphasis added). Additionally, as discussed in Part I, the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment does not specify that
notice must accompany a search that meets the threshold requirement of reasonableness.
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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States'89 has been widely accepted as expressing the test for determining the constitutionality of a search under the Fourth Amendment.
According to Justice Harlan, the Fourth Amendment offers protection
when an individual has an actual or subjective expectation
of privacy
90
"that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."
Third, while the Court has not specifically decided whether the
Fourth Amendment requires that notice be given pursuant to the execution of a warrant, it has recently addressed the idea of notice in an
analogous situation. In Wilson v. Arkansas,191 the Court considered
whether Arkansas state police had violated the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment rights in failing to "knock and announce" their presence
before executing a conventional search warrant for the petitioner's
residence. 192 In language echoing Justice Harlan's expression of the
reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment, the Court held
that the common law "knock-and-announce" principle "forms a part
of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment."' 93
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Thomas noted, however, that
"ft]he Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness
should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailinglaw enforcement interests.... [T]he common-law
principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances."' 94 Significantly, Justice Thomas observed that "law enforcement interests may also
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry."'9
189. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the government used electronic surveillance to listen
to and record the petitioner's words spoken into a telephone receiver in a public telephone
booth. The majority opinion explained that the government's actions in listening to and
recording the petitioner's telephone conversations constituted a "search and seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment because the actions violated the privacy interests Katz relied upon in using the public telephone. Id. at 350-52.
190. Id. at 361. For a more recent restatement of the reasonableness test, see New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (stating that "the underlying command of the
Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable").
Note that the Supreme Court's reliance on a test of reasonableness in interpreting the
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause resembles the Court's approach to interpreting the Warrants Clause, where the Court has refused to use specific tests and has instead
relied solely on a "flexible" test that considers factors under the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983), discussed supra note 26.
191. 115 S.Ct. 1914 (1995).
192. Id. at 1915. The "knock and announce" rule, also referred to as the "rule of announcement" or the "notice requirement," states that a police officer who seeks entry into
a home for the purpose of executing a search or arrest warrant must first identify him or
herself and state his or her purpose for demanding entry. 1 CHARLES E. TORicA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 165 (13th ed. 1989).
193. Wilson, 115 S.Ct. at 1915 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 1918 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 1919.
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If the common law practice of knocking and announcing is understood as a means of providing notice to the inhabitants of a residence
that a warrant is to be executed, 96 then Wilson provides further support for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not require
notice. In other words, the Court's holding that a "knock and announce" procedure (that functions primarily as a means of providing
notice) is not constitutionally required suggests that other forms of
notice also may not be constitutionally required. While Wilson clearly
states that it is constitutionally permissible to consider whether197a
"knock and announce" procedure was used in a particular search,
Wilson equally clearly explains that the "flexible requirement of reasonableness"' 98 under the Fourth Amendment does not require the
rigid rule that knocking and announcing always be considered. 99 As
Justice Thomas explained, it is proper and legitimate for trial courts to
consider whether a "knock and announce" procedure was used in a
particular search. 200 But this consideration, under Wilson, should not
lead to the conclusion that a "knock and announce" procedure is a
constitutionally compelled requirement under the Fourth Amendment. 20 ' As discussed above, similar conclusions may be drawn for
the provision of notice generally.
Thus, Wilson returns to the principle originally articulated by Justice Harlan in Katz that searches are constitutional if they are reasonable. Rather than reading specific requirements into the Fourth
Amendment, the Court is favoring a reasonableness analysis that allows it greater flexibility in addressing the tensions between govern-

196. See ToRicA, supra note 192 and accompanying text (describing how the "knock
and announce" rule is also known as the "rule of announcement"); Todd Witten, Note,
Wilson v. Arkansas: Thirty Years After Ker The Supreme Court Addresses the Knock and
Announce Issue, 29 AKRON L. REv. 447, 448 n.10 (1996).
197. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918.
198. Id.
199. Commentators have challenged the holding in Wilson. See Mark Josephson, Note,
Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment-Must Police Knock and Announce Themselves Before Kicking in the Doorof A House?, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 125152 (1996) (arguing that unannounced entries are presumptively unreasonable and should
only be permitted where a "reasonably prudent officer" would be warranted in believing
that an exigent circumstance existed); Witten, supra note 196, at 464-65 (criticizing Wilson
and its reasonableness approach for failing to provide sufficient guidance to lower courts in
determining when an unannounced entry is reasonable). But see William J. Struntz, The
Substantive Originsof Criminal Procedure,105 YALE L.J. 393,446 n.240 (1995) (discussing
how Wilson is consistent with the Court's general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
the idea that reasonableness determines constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment).
200. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919.
201. Id. at 1918.
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ment interests in effective law enforcement and individual security
202
and privacy interests.
(4) Electronic Surveillance Under Title III and Notice

The Court has relied upon this Fourth Amendment flexibility in
considering the constitutionality of more technologically-advanced
forms of police investigation not originally envisioned in the 1790s by
the Framers. As technology has advanced, the Court has been faced
with increasingly more sophisticated forms of police surveillance, such
as wiretapping and electronic surveillance.2 03 In Katz, for example,
the Supreme Court rejected for the first time the idea that there must
be a physical trespass to trigger the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 2° More important, at least in the surreptitious search context,
was the Court's statement that "officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an anescape of the suspect or the
nouncement would provoke the
destruction of critical evidence.12 05
202. Id. (noting the need for flexibility in considering law enforcement interests). The
Supreme Court has been explicit in its rejection of specific guidelines (especially when
asked to read the specific guidelines into constitutional provisions) and its preference for
general principles of reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (rejecting, in interpreting the Warrants Clause, the specific traditional two-pronged test for probable cause in favor of a more flexible "totality-ofthe-circumstances" approach); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (declining, in interpreting the Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause, to "transform th[e]
judicial preference [for arrest warrants] into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the
Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation"); see also
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 811 ("By focusing on constitutional reasonableness, we restore the Fourth [Amendment] to its rightful place.").
203. Armist, supra note 44, at 936. See also supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text
(describing examples of current and future uses of surreptitious search warrants and electronic surveillance).
204. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Beginning in the 1920s with Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), the Supreme Court consistently held that
non-trespassory surveillance (namely electronic wiretapping) did not implicate Fourth
Amendment rights because the Fourth Amendment was believed to apply only to searches
and seizures of tangible property. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1940).
Katz represented a significant departure from the Court's prior understanding of the
Fourth Amendment. See supra note 189 for description of facts and holding. In reaching
its decision, the Court explained that "the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure
of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any [technical trespass] .... [T]he reach of th[e Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Katz, 389 U.S. at
353 (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 355 n.16.
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In response to Katz, and in an a partial attempt to regulate these
new investigatory techniques, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.206 Under the Act,
various federal officials may authorize an application to a federal
judge for an order allowing wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping
to discover evidence of specific federal crimes.207 Only evidence obtained through the lawful execution of the order is admissible. 20 8
Before an interception order is granted, the judge must determine
whether the applicants have attempted to use normal investigative
procedures. 20 9 Significantly, section 2518 provides that notice shall be
served on the intercepted party within a reasonable time not later
than ninety days after application for the order. 210
In Dalia v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether
a covert entry to install an electronic listening device authorized under
Title III comported with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth
206. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1996)).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1996).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1996).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1996). Section 2518 states:
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a
wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application shall include
the following information:
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous ....
Id.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1996). Section 2518(8)(d) provides:
Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days after the filing of an application for an order of approval under section 2518(7)(b) which is denied or the
termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing or denying
judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the order or the application, and such other parties to intercepted communications as the judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall
include notice of (1) the fact of the entry of the order or the application;
(2) the date of the entry and the.period of authorized, approved or disapproved interception, or the denial of the application; and
(3) the fact that during the period wire, oral, or electronic communications
were or were not intercepted.
The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may in his discretion make available
to such person or his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communications, applications and orders as the judge determines to be in the interest
of justice. On an ex parte showing of good cause to a judge of competent jurisdiction the serving of the inventory required by this subsection may be postponed.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Amendment.211 Relying on Katz, the Dalia court stated that the
Fourth Amendment "does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging
equipment. '212 Further, the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment only requires that searches be reasonable, and does not compel
specific details regarding the execution of a search warrant.2 13
Thus, just as it has in discussing searches in other contexts, the
Court has held that an electronic surveillance search is reasonable
when it satisfies the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps not surprisingly, especially considering its reasonabless
approach for more conventional searches, 21 4 the Court in both Katz
and Dalia steadfastly refused to read into the Fourth Amendment specific procedures (such as notice) regarding the execution of search
warrants. More significantly, Katz and Daliasuggest that the Court is
willing to apply the test of reasonableness to, and not categorically
prohibit, a variety of technologically advanced investigative procedures that differ from the more conventional searches envisioned by
the Framers as falling under the Fourth Amendment. Congress,
meanwhile, has created a ninety-day limit on the amount of the time
that may pass before post-electronic surveillance
notice must be pro215
vided to the target of the surveillance.
B. The Concept of Notice and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure

In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's argument that reasonable postsearch notice is constitutionally required for surreptitious searches,
the Second Circuit explained in Pangburn that the roots of a postsearch notice requirement could be found in the language of Rule
211. 441 U.S. 238 (1979). Agents had properly obtained an order under Ttle III (section 2518) to intercept telephone conversations in petitioner's business office. Id. at 24145. In order to install the listening device, agents covertly entered the petitioner's property. Id. at 245.
212. Id. at 248.
213. Id. at 257-58. The Court noted that "it is generally left to the discretion of the
executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of
a search authorized by warrant." Id. at 257. In addition, the Court observed that
[i]t
would extend the Warrant Clause to the extreme to require that, whenever it
is reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment rights may be affected in more than
one way, the court must set forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the
executing officers.... More important, we would promote empty formalism were
we to require magistrates to make explicit -whatunquestionably is implicit in bugging authorizations: that a covert entry, with its attendant interference with
Fourth Amendment interests, may be necessary for the installation of the surveillance equipment.
Id. at 258 (citations and footnotes omitted).
214. See supra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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41.216 Even the Ninth Circuit, while ultimately relying on a constitutional argument, suggested in both Freitas217 and Johns2 l 8 that the failure of a warrant to provide for reasonable post-search notice might be
a violation of Rule 41(d).
An analysis of the language of Rule 41(d), however, suggests that
it has only marginal relevance in the surreptitious search context.21 9
Adopted in 1944, well before Congress had envisioned the sophisticated investigatory techniques now employed by law enforcement, the
language of the rule is clearly intended to set guidelines for the execution of conventional searches.220 Rule 41(d) requires the searching
officer to "give to the person from whom or from whose premises the
property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken" or, alternatively, to leave a copy and receipt at the premises searched. 221 The rule also requires the officers to make a "return"
reporting the results of the search to the magistrate promptly, "accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken." 2 Significantly,
223
the rule makes no mention of a seven-day requirement for notice,
presumably because it was assumed by Congress in drafting Rule 41
that individuals would be present during the search and thus would
not need post-search notice. While it could be argued that the failure
of Rule 41 to include a specific reference to post-search notice reflects
Congress' implicit disfavoring of surreptitious search warrants, such
an argument fails to recognize that Congress could not possibly have
intended to express its dissatisfaction of surreptitious search warrants
forty years before their first reported use. The emphasis in Rule 41 on
property being "taken" reveals the fact that the rule was undoubtedly
aimed at protecting private citizens from arbitrary property
seizures.2 4 More importantly, the emphasis on property suggests that
the rule is of limited value in the surreptitious search context, since
surreptitious search warrants specify that no property be "taken" or
disturbed during a surreptitious search2- 5
The Pangburn court held that a notice requirement could be inferred from "the Rule's requirements for service of a copy of the war216. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
219. For the text of Rule 41(d), see supra note 41.
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
222. Id.
223. See supra note 41.
224. Congressional emphasis on property rights was consistent with the 1940s idea that
privacy rights were inextricably linked to property rights. See Walker, supra note 14, at 553
n.37 (citing traditional idea prevalent during first half of twentieth century that "a man's
home is his castle") (citations omitted).
225. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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rant and for provision of an inventory. ' 226 Such an interpretation of
Rule 41 seems logical at first glance, since an individual would obviously have notice of a search when handed a copy of the warrant (as
Rule 41(d) provides). What is more troubling is the conclusion that
Rule 41 requires post-search notice within seven days. While the
Pangburn court did not explicitly state that Rule 41 compelled postsearch notice within seven days, it did acknowledge the Ninth Circuit's
seven-day rule.227 In so doing, the Second Circuit implicitly suggested
that Rule 41 (as the only justifiable basis for post-search notice) required post-search notice within seven days.
Such a wooden reading of the rule, however, conflicts with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 41. In interpreting Rule
41(d), the Court has not demanded rigid adherence to the letter of the
rule. In Katz, the Court observed that the language of Rule 41 does
not require that a target receive notice prior to a judicially-authorized
search, noting:
Nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose an inflexible requirement of prior notice. Rule 41(d) does require federal
officers to serve upon the person searched a copy of the warrant and
a receipt describing the material obtained, but it does not invariably
require that this be done before the search takes place3P 8
In a related context, the Supreme Court held that a warrant authorizing a pen register search for a period of twenty days "did not
conflict" with the seemingly explicit provision in Rule 41(c) that a
search be conducted within ten days.229 Together, these decisions indicate that the guidelines of Rule 41 are to be interpreted flexibly. On
occasion, the Court has created specfic guidelines to assist lower
courts in their consideration of Fourth Amendment searches.230 But
such occasions have been rare, and the Court has generally resisted
226. United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1993).
227. Id. at 449-50 ("Although we have required that seven days notice be given after
covert entries for which search without physical seizure has been authorized, that notice
requirement is grounded in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 and is not compelled by the
Constitution.").
The decision in Pangburn creates some confusion because the court ultimately held
that the failure of a surreptitious search warrant to provide for notice would be excused
absent intentional disregard of notice or prejudice. See supranotes 161-62 and accompanying text.
228. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967).
229. United States v. New York Tel., 434 U.S. 159, 168-70 & n.16 (1977) (holding that,
while Title III did not govern the authorization of pen registers, a district judge had the
power to authorize such pen registers upon a finding of probable cause).
230. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). In McLaughlin, the
Court held that probable cause hearings must be held within 48 hours of an arrest to satisfy
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 56. While the determination of probable
cause within 48 hours does not alone determine whether such a procedure passes constitutional muster, the 48-hour limit creates a presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 56-57.
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the impulse to spontaneously invent specific rules in the Fourth
Amendment context. 231 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Court would disapprove of a judicially-crafted seven-day notice requirement derived from a rule that the Court has interpreted with
greater flexibility.
Overall, application of Rule 41 to the surreptitious search context
sheds little light on the question of when post-search notice should be
provided. Neither the language of Rule 41 nor its interpretation by
the Supreme Court compels the seven-day notice requirement proposed by the Ninth Circuit. While the rule may be read to imply some
form of notice, nothing about the rule's language or the Court's discussion of the rule sets forth any guidelines regarding the issue of
when notice should be given. More generally, though, Rule 41 requires actions (specifically, leaving an inventory and copy of the warrant with the target of the search), which threaten to undermine the
primary purpose (conducting a secret or covert search without the
knowledge of the target) of a surreptitious search. 232 In light of the
fact that the Supreme Court has expressly condoned covert searches,
as the above discussion indicates, such inconsistency suggests that the
application of the antiquated language of Rule 41 to the surreptitious
search context produces an unsatisfying answer to the question of
when post-search notice is required.
IV.

A Proposed Framework for Evaluating Surreptitious
Search Warrants
While neither the Constitution nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure compels a seven-day post-search notice requirement for surreptitious search warrants, there is still reason to believe that post-search notice can serve a valuable function in the
surreptitious search context. As a matter of both law and policy, no231. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,423-24 (1976) (explaining that the
judicial preference for a warrant under the Fourth Amendment should not be transformed
into a constitutional rule); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 94-95 (1967) (Harlan, J., dis-

senting) (discussing how "reasonableness surely implies that this Court must not constrain
in any grudging fashion the development of procedures, consistent with the Amendment's

essential purposes, by which methods of search and seizure unknown in 1789 may be appropriately controlled").
While the Court has hesitated before creating specific rules in the Fourth Amendment

context, Congress has more actively drafted legislation covering issues arising under the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, supra

notes 206-210 and accompanying text; Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88
Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1996)) (creating time limits
before which trials must occur for criminal defendants).

232. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16 (describing how "the point [of electronic surveillance of petitioner Katz] would obviously have been lost" if government agents had been
required to inform Katz in advance of their surveillance).
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tice can play a critical role in the promotion and protection of individual privacy interests. But the current state of the law of surreptitious
search warrants provides little guidance in determining what weight
notice should be given in evaluating whether a given surreptitious
search warrant survives constitutional scrutiny. More specifically, the
disagreement between the Ninth and Second Circuits concerning both
the appropriate legal standards that should apply in the execution of
surreptitious search warrants and the underlying bases for why surreptitious search warrants are legally permitted suggests that a reexamination of the current approach to issuing and executing surreptitious
search warrants is necessary. While Congress could enact legislation
creating uniform standards for the execution of surreptitious search
warrants, this Note argues that courts should adopt a reasonableness
approach more consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Such an approach affords courts more flexibilty
in addressing various factual scenarios and balancing individual and
governmental interests. Ultimately, such an approach also produces
more satisfying results.
A. The Relationship Between Notice and Privacy
Although the Supreme Court apparently does not consider notice
to be constitutionally required under the Fourth Amendment, 2 3 notice serves important functions in the conventional search warrant
context. First, notice is traditionally recognized as protecting fundamental privacy interests by permitting the target of a search to surrender his or her privacy under processes of law.2 34 Under this idea,
notice also "minimizes the chance of entry of the wrong premises by
mistake and the consequent subjecting of innocent persons to 'the
shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an announced police
intrusion."' 235 Second, notice is generally seen as decreasing the potential for violence in a search because startled householders are
made aware of the nature of the search. 236 Third, notice may protect
against the unnecessary destruction of private property by the searching officers, since a householder
with notice may voluntarily admit an
237
officer executing a warrant.
233. See supra Part III.A.(3).
234. LAFAvE, supra note 48, § 4.8(a), at 272-73.
235. Id. (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part)).
236. LAFAVE, supra note 48, § 4.8, at 272. Under this theory, unannounced breaking
and entry into a home could lead an individual to believe that his or her safety was in peril
and thus cause him or her to take defensive measures not otherwise taken had he or she
known of the warrant. Id. (citing State v. Carufel, 314 A.2d 144, 147 (R.I. 1974)).
237. Note, Announcement in Police Entries,supra note 167, at 140-42.
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Of these three functions of notice, only the protection of privacy
interests seems relevant for the execution of surreptitious search warrants. The belief that notice will decrease the potential for violence
does not really apply for surreptitious searches, since the warrants are
often purposely executed when the inhabitants of a residence are not
present (presumably so that the targets of the search are unaware that
a search has even occurred).2 38 Consequently, the chance of confrontation is minimized. Further, surreptitious search warrants invariably
avoid concerns about the unnecessary destruction of property because
the warrants do not envision a seizure of any property.239 As disexpressly
cussed in Part II above, surreptitious search warrants often 240
state that property is not to be disturbed during the search.
While surveillance prior to a surreptitious search is likely to eliminate the fear that officers will search the wrong property, surreptitious
searches without any notice may potentially strike at fundamental privacy concerns. 241 Some commentators argue, for instance, that a surreptitious search warrant "has the potential to bestow on law
enforcement agents unlimited license to rifle through a person's pri238. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. It is possible that, in obtaining entry
into a target's property, agents executing a surreptitious search warrant could inadvertently
destroy or disturb property (namely, a lock on a door or storage locker). Agents would
likely attempt to minimize such disturbances to a target's property, since any evidence of
the agents' surreptitious entry would reveal to the owner or resident of the property that
he or she is the target of surveillance.
240. For examples of this type of restriction in a surreptitious search warrant, see supra
notes 61 (Freitas), 86 (Johns), and 117 (Villegas).
241. While it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss at length how the Supreme
Court has interpreted Fourth Amendment privacy rights, several critical points may be
raised here. The original notion of a broad legal "right to be let alone" first appeared in
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1879). Several years later,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis elaborated on the idea, explaining that the right
to life "has come to mean the right to enjoy life-the right to be let alone." Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
Brandeis' idea of privacy later reappeared while he was a Justice of the Supreme Court.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (observing that the right to be "let alone" is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men"). The idea of the Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy has
become firmly entrenched in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and vocabulary, as evidenced by the fact that the current test under the Fourth Amendment requires a consideration of individual privacy interests. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
discussed supra in notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
Recently, it has been argued that the current approach to the Fourth Amendment, and
particularly its focus on privacy, does not adequately protect the values behind the Fourth
Amendment. See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1751, 1754, 1777 (1994) (suggesting that the underlying value of the Fourth Amendment is that of "trust" between the
government and citizenry). This Note will adopt the Court's traditional approach to the
Fourth Amendment and its emphasis on privacy.
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vate residence without the owner's knowledge or consent. '2 42 Even
though such an allegation seems unlikely to be true (because a judicial
officer must first confirm the existence of probable cause before issuing a search warrant, as the Fourth Amendment requires243), it implicitly raises the important issue that the provision of notice of a search
may be critical in limiting government infringements of individual privacy interests. Therefore, because notice may be relevant in protecting privacy interests (especially in the surreptitious search warrant
context), and because privacy interests are of paramount importance
in deciding whether a particular search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, 244 notice becomes an important factor that should be
considered in deciding whether a particular search is reasonable.
B. Congressional Action to Regulate Surreptitious Search Warrants
One alternative would be for Congress to enact legislation to uniformly regulate the issuance and execution of surreptitious search
warrants. Most of the commentators who have discussed surreptitious
search warrants advocate such legislation. 245 As demonstrated by its
creation of a system of rules for electronic surveillance under Title
III,246 Congress has both the power and ability to comprehensively
regulate the government's use of highly-advanced investigative tools
that threaten to impair individual privacy rights arising under the
Fourth Amendment. In theory, congressional legislation on surreptitious search warrants would eliminate the need for federal courts to
engage in the case-by-case reasonableness analysis dictated by the
Fourth Amendment. 247 Additionally, congressional legislation in this
area would avoid the troublesome application of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to surreptitious searches. 248
In drafting regulations for the issuance and execution of surreptitious search warrants, Congress might find guidance in Title III. In
Title III, Congress created a number of threshold requirements that
the government must meet before beginning electronic surveillance. 249
Chief among these "necessity" requirements is a showing that infor242. See Armist, supra note 44, at 946.
243. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 14, at 559-60 (suggesting a "comprehensive legislative
package" to regulate covert searches generally, including an amended Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); Corr, supra note, 46 at 1115 (proposing that Rule 41 be
amended "to specifically mention surreptitious entry warrants and provide guidance in
their use" so as to encourage "uniformity among the circuits").
246. See supra Part III.A.(4).
247. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
249.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1996). See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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mation gained from the electronic surveillance cannot be gained from
any other more conventional form of surveillance. 50o In addition to
creating a necessity requirement, Title III sets a maximum limit for
the amount of time that can pass (ninety days) before the target of the
surveillance must be notified of the surveillance. 25 ' Congress undoubtedly believed that the explicit provisions of Title III would prevent overreaching by the government in using sophisticated
investigative measures.
The adoption of analogous requirements for surreptitious
searches could assuage concerns that surreptitious searches violate
privacy interests. 25z Congress could require, for instance, that agents
applying for a surreptitious search warrant make a specific showing
that information cannot be gained through any other investigative
means, as it has specified for electronic surveillance warrants under
Title III. Congress could demand that this showing of necessity be
explicit in the affidavits supporting the warrant.
If Congress adopts a specific post-search notice requirement for
surreptitious search warrants, Congress should view surreptitious
searches in relation to other potentially invasive forms of surveillance.
Arguably, surreptitious searches are no more intrusive, and possibly
even less intrusive, than wiretaps or other forms of electronic surveillance under Title III. Unlike telephone or wiretap surveillance, which
collect information continuously for up to ninety days, a surreptitious
search is an instantaneous search with a clear beginning and end (as
prescribed in the warrant). Additionally, surreptitious searches are
usually short in duration. Furthermore, a surreptitious search is much
more focused than a wiretap, which collects information indiscriminately for a long period of time. Wiretaps collect all conversations
within the range of the listener, including the communications of third
parties unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance. A surreptitious
search, on the other hand, seeks much more specific information. The
danger of a wiretap being used as a "fishing expedition" to gather
information is surely as great as that same danger in the surreptitious
search context. Considering that Congress has allowed for Title III
surveillance to continue for as long as ninety days without notice to
the target of the surveillance, it would be inconsistent for Congress to
require that post-search notice for surreptitious searches be provided
any sooner than ninety days.
In all likelihood, however, the hope that Congress will legislate in
the surreptitious search warrant context is dim. While the fact that
only a handful of reported cases on surreptitious search warrants ex250. Id.
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1996). See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
252. Armist, supra note 44, at 946.
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ists might suggest that Congress is unaware of the state of confusion in
the law, it is also reasonable to believe that Congress may simply be
unwilling to legislate in this context. It is equally possible that Congress will fail to act because political pressures demand consideration
of other issues less burdened with vital constitutional rights. Even if
Congress were to decide to legislate, it is not clear that such a decision
would produce desirable results. Although explicit statutory language
limits judicial discretion and (at least in theory) leads to uniform results in application, concerns may arise that explicit rules ultimately
lead to unfairness because they fail to take into consideration the innumerable factual differences between one search and another. 2 3 As
a result, congressional action would create stability but sacrifice the
usual flexibility that courts rely upon in the Fourth Amendment
context.
C. A Reasonableness Approach
The preferable approach would be for courts to reject the idea of
per se rules in the surreptitious search context and instead adopt the
reasonableness framework used by the courts in other Fourth Amendment contexts. 254 This flexible approach would necessarily include a
rejection of the concept that post-search notice is required when executing a surreptitious search warrant.255 This does not mean, however, that post-search notice should play no role in the execution of a
surreptitious search warrant. Instead, notice should be one of several
factors that courts consider in determining whether a surreptitious
search warrant satisfies the requirements of the Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Under the reasonableness approach, courts should balance individual and government interests to determine whether, and under
what conditions, a surreptitious search warrant should be issued. As a
253. For an example of this concern in the criminal procedure context, see United
States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed.
Reg. 18,046 (1987) (recognizing the inevitable tension between having uniform sentences
as directed by the Sentencing Guidelines on one hand, and concerns that the Guidelines
lead to proportionality problems because they fail to account for factual differences between cases by imposing the same sentence on all individuals charged with a specific offense (absent specific factors for departure) on the other).
254. See supra Part III.A.(3).

255. This rejection is not so revolutionary in light of the fact that both the Ninth Circuit
and the Second Circuit have held as constitutional, usually on the grounds of a Leon good
faith exception, surreptitious search warrants that lacked post-search notice. Thus, while
explaining that post-search notice should be given (usually within seven days), the courts
have avoided actually applying the post-search notice rule in a way that leads to the suppression of information gained from a surreptitious search. See supraPart II. The fact that
the post-search notice rule articulated by the courts can be so easily circumvented strongly
suggests that the rule has little practical applicability.
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preliminary matter, courts should consider whether the government
has a legitimate interest in postponing notice of a surreptitious
search.256 One argument for postponing notice relies on the idea that
providing notice would endanger officers involved in various aspects
of the investigation of a particular case (including confidential informants and other officers actively involved in the infiltration of complex conspiracies),25 7 Thus, in order to assure the integrity and covert
nature of the search, it might be reasonable to delay notice. Law enforcement might also argue that the postponement of notice allows
officers to protect members of the public and the targets of the search
themselves. While some have challenged this argument,2 8 it is not
altogether without merit. Not surprisingly, all reported cases involving surreptitious search warrants have been narcotics cases, where
toxic and highly explosive chemicals have been involved.259 Another
possible reason for delaying or dispensing with notice might be to allow law enforcement greater time to gather evidence in a criminal investigation, allocate manpower based upon the stage of the crime, and
gauge the best time to conduct a conventional search and seizure of
evidence. Against all of these government interests in delaying notice,
interests that individuals
courts should weigh the significant privacy
2 60
enjoy under the Fourth Amendment.
256. Some have suggested that greater deference be accorded to government interests
when law enforcement is investigating serious crimes. See Amar, Fourth Amendment
supra note 24, at 802 ("It clearly states a global truth that makes intuitive sense to police
officials and citizens alike: serious crimes and serious needs can justify more serious
searches and seizures."). But see Armist, supra note 44, at 948-50 (noting that government
justifications for using surreptitious search warrants should not trump legitimate privacy
concerns).
257. This argument has had particular effect with narcotics cases, since it is presumed
that drug dealers and manufacturers will be armed and prepared to use physical force to
avoid detection by law enforcement. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 N.E.2d 649,
651 (Mass. 1993) (holding that entry without notice was permissible to search place where
drugs were kept because affiant's experience was that "drug dealers often carry handguns
to protect themselves").
258. Armist, supra note 44, at 949-50 (explaining that the rationale of a surreptitious
search being used to avoid harm to the public or to the targets of the search is equally true
for a conventional search and seizure).
259. See supra Part II. In Freitas,for example, the investigating agents suggested that
the use of highly toxic and explosive precursor chemicals in the manufacture of
methamphetamine created serious dangers for the public. United States v. Freitas, 610 F.
Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and remanded,800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). But
see United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the mere
suspicion of potentially explosive methamphetamine lab did not justify warrantless entry).
The Supreme Court has recognized this "public safety" idea in other contexts. See
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) (upholding warrantless search for revolver
in seized car as a caretaking function for the "safety of the general public" where the
search prevented the gun from falling into the hands of vandals).
260. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
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Courts should consider other factors as well in deciding whether
to issue a surreptitious search warrant. As discussed above in the context of possible congressional legislation on surreptitious search warrants, it is imperative that an agent seeking a surreptitious search
warrant provide a reasonable and articulable explanation in his or her
supporting affidavit for why such a warrant is necessary under the circumstances. 261 In evaluating the necessity of a particular application
for a surreptitious search warrant, courts should take note of the nature of the offense (and especially whether it involves violence or danger to the community), any information suggesting that evidence will
be destroyed without a surreptitious search, the technical sophistication of the target, and whether the target reasonably knows that he or
she is the subject of a criminal investigation.
At the same time, courts should take into account the expected
duration of the surreptitious search, the number of agents who will be
executing the search warrant, and any methods of observation used by
the agents once inside the target's property (especially whether the
agents should be permitted to take photographs or make video recordings of the target's property). Where courts do in fact decide to
issue surreptitious search warrants, the warrants should be restricted
to the maximum extent possible to minimize infringements upon the
target's privacy rights.
Conclusion
In the wake of the federal government's increased emphasis on
curtailing drug use generally, and methamphetamine use in particular,
surreptitious search warrants may well play a more prominent role in
the immediate future. Without question, surreptitious searches can
serve as effective tools for law enforcement in gaining valuable information in ongoing criminal investigations. For surreptitious searches
to be used legitimately, however, a sufficient legal justification for
their use must exist. The current disagreement between the Ninth and
Second Circuits about the underlying legal justification for surreptitious searches, as well as the appropriate legal standards that should
apply in their execution, seriously undermines the legitimacy of surreptitious search warrants.
In response to the confusion in the state of the law of surreptitious search warrants, this Note has suggested that the current approach to surreptitious search warrants should be redirected towards
one more consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Courts should engage in a genuine balancing that more
accurately reflects the Court's reasonableness approach to Fourth
261.

See supra Part IV.B.
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Amendment searches. To this end, courts should carefully consider
and weigh government interests in obtaining a surreptitious search
warrant against individual privacy concerns. Attention should be particularly focused on the necessity of using a surreptitious search warrant and the question of when and if post-search notice should be
provided. In adopting this new framework for surreptitious search
warrants, courts may more flexibly and reasonably consider legal and
policy-based reasons for why such a warrant is justified.

